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ABSTRACT
While traditional HPC has and continues to satisfy most workflows,
a new generation of researchers has emerged looking for sophis-
ticated, scalable, on-demand, and self-service control of compute
infrastructure in a cloud-like environment. Many also seek safe
harbors to operate on or store sensitive and/or controlled-access
data in a high capacity environment.
To cater to these modern users, the Minnesota Supercomputing
Institute designed and deployed Stratus, a locally-hosted cloud
environment powered by the OpenStack platform, and backed by
Ceph storage. The subscription-based service complements existing
HPC systems by satisfying the following unmet needs of our users:
a) on-demand availability of compute resources; b) long-running
jobs (i.e., > 30 days); c) container-based computing with Docker;
and d) adequate security controls to comply with controlled-access
data requirements.
This document provides an in-depth look at the design of Stratus
with respect to security and compliance with the NIH’s controlled-
access data policy. Emphasis is placed on lessons learned while
integrating OpenStack and Ceph features into a so-called “walled
garden”, and how those technologies influenced the security design.
Many features of Stratus, including tiered secure storage with the
introduction of a controlled-access data “cache”, fault-tolerant live-
migrations, and fully integrated two-factor authentication, depend
on recent OpenStack and Ceph features.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored.
For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
PEARC ’18, July 22–26, 2018, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6446-1/18/07.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3219104.3219165
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Virtualization and security; • Com-
puter systems organization→ Cloud computing; • Informa-
tion systems→ Open source software; • Applied computing→
Service-oriented architectures;
KEYWORDS
OpenStack, Ceph, Protected Data, dbGaP, S3, Private Cloud, Docker,
Cloud Computing
ACM Reference Format:
Evan F. Bollig, Graham T. Allan, Benjamin J. Lynch, Yectli A. Huerta,
Mathew Mix, Edward A. Munsell, Raychel M. Benson, and Brent Swartz.
2018. Leveraging OpenStack and Ceph for a Controlled-Access Data Cloud.
In PEARC ’18: Practice and Experience in Advanced Research Computing,
July 22–26, 2018, Pittsburgh, PA, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3219104.3219165
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing has taken the world by storm. For most, the
Cloud promises immediate, on-demand access to resources, self-
service management of infrastructure, plus the ability to operate
with a level of agility and isolation not possible on traditional
high performance computing (HPC) systems. Institutions like the
Minnesota Supercomputing Institute (MSI)—primary provider for
research computing services at the University of Minnesota—are
fully aware of the allure of Cloud Computing to many of their users.
For many years, MSI has sought to provide a few fully-managed
HPC clusters as a shared resource for users, unified by a single
global file system, and centralized user authentication. At present,
MSI hosts two clusters, the latest of which, Mesabi, was purchased
in 2015 and is still among the top 20 university-owned supercom-
puters in the nation. These clusters are available to all MSI users as
batch scheduled resources, with the scheduler tracking a number
of fair-share parameters to decide how and when jobs are run. Al-
though Mesabi is predominantly homogenous in architecture and
networking, heterogeneity does exist to meet diverse user needs in
the specific configurations of memory (e.g., nodes range between
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64 GB and 1 TB), as well as the presence of solid-state drives and/or
accelerator boards.
Whereas traditional HPC continues to satisfy the majority of
needs across research disciplines, there is a growing trend toward
data-intensive work with ever larger storage and compute require-
ments, as well as more stringent data-use agreements. Data-use
agreements in particular are cumbersome to satisfy on HPC clusters
where one-off modifications necessary to satisfy agency require-
ments for logging, backups (or lack thereof), and isolation would
invasively impact the workflows and user-experiences of all users
in the shared resource. The overhead in additional maintenance,
monitoring, and user education may be acceptable for a small num-
ber of edge-cases, but the burden snowballs quickly to become
unsustainable.
Compounding the issue, the popularity of Cloud Computing has
given rise to more sophisticated researchers who cross the role of
developer with operations. These users, referred to as DevOps, seek
an environment unchained from managed infrastructure, where
they have the rights to escalate privileges to install software, man-
age firewalls, and control other aspects of system configuration, all
in the name of agility and productivity.
Facing the need to accommodate and sustain this trend, MSI
designed and built Stratus, an on-premise cloud for protected data.
Stratus is a subscription-based Infrastructure-as-a-Service that en-
ables users to operate within their own virtual machines (VMs).
Stratus is powered by the Newton version of the OpenStack [14]
cloud platform, and is backed by the Luminous release of Ceph [19]
storage. Stratus was opened to MSI users at the start of fiscal year
2018 (July, 2017). Beyond managing protected data, Stratus offers
three features not present in MSI’s existing cyberinfrastructure: a)
on-demand availability of compute resources with self-service user
control; b) long-running jobs (e.g., > 30 days) that are live-migrated
between compute nodes, and persist through maintenance peri-
ods; and c) container-based computing with Docker, which comes
pre-loaded on MSI-blessed VMs.
OpenStack was chosen for multiple reasons: a) it has built-in
support for multi-tenancy, software defined networking, logging,
SSL/TLS encrypted traffic and other features to make compliance
easier; b) the modular OpenStack services enable mix-and-match
configuration and are decoupled for fault tolerance; and c) a massive
open source community distinguishes the project as the leading
software for cloud deployments across industry and academia. Ceph
is free, open source, and backed by much of the same community as
OpenStack. Ceph excels as an efficient, low-cost storage platform
with the ability to scale to many PBs. The stability, scalability, and
value of OpenStack and Ceph have been vetted by large deploy-
ments like CERN [2] and the NSF funded JetStream [18].
In its initial release, Stratus is designed expressly to satisfy the
NIH Genomic Data Sharing (GDS) Policy for the Database of Geno-
types and Phenotypes (dbGaP) [12]. Although other more stringent
regulations and standards exist (e.g., HIPAA, FISMA, and ITAR to
name a few), tackling dbGaP data is a good launching point for
Stratus in that it addresses basic needs for access logging, data en-
cryption, two-factor authentication, etc. Furthermore, it satisfies an
immediate need at the University of Minnesota where researchers
have no alternative available to analyze dbGaP data. Compliance
with other regulations can be added in the future.
Stratus is most similar in spirit to the Bionimbus Protected Data
Cloud (PDC) [10]; a fully GDS- and HIPAA-compliant platform
at the University of Chicago. Both Stratus and Bionimbus PDC
are built on OpenStack and have Ceph storage. Stratus storage is
entirely Ceph, in contrast to the current Bionimbus PDC, which
has two object stores for protected data: 400 TB Ceph S3 and 1.7 PB
IBM CleverSafe S3. Furthermore, Bionimbus PDC is a NIH Trusted
Partner and allowed to maintain a complete persistent clone of
the dbGaP data, while Stratus presents users a multi-tiered storage
environment with a “dbGaP Cache” to store only active subsets of
the dbGaP data in a scratch-like space. When the object lifecycle is
complete or data becomes stale, they are deleted from the object
store. This allows Stratus to avoid bit rot, and conserve storage
costs.
In a similar vein, the CancerCollaboratory [11] at the Ontario
Institute for Cancer Research, is a Ceph-backed OpenStack cloud for
cancer-related data. CancerCollaboratory is designed for maximum
storage capacity, which is used to persistently clone, among other
things, dbGaP data dealing with cancer from Bionimbus PDC.
The NIH has also sponsored three public cloud pilots: a) Broad
Institute FireCloud [7]; b) Seven Bridges Cancer Genomics Cloud
[3]; and c) the Institute for Systems Biology Cancer Genomics
Cloud [8]. All three pilots run on public providers (Google/Amazon),
where the annual cost of computing is substantially higher than
on a local on-premise cloud. To alleviate this burden, the NIH is
currently offering credits for approved projects to spend at the
public providers.
2 STRATUS CLOUD PLATFORM
Stratus is a relatively small cluster, less than one rack in size.
The Stratus compute hardware is currently twenty HPE ProLiant
XL230a nodes, each with two Intel E5-2680v4 (14-core) CPUs, 256
GB of RAM, and 10 GbE networking to the outside world. Hyper-
threading is enabled for a total core count of 1120 cores. An array
of eight HPE Apollo 4200 storage servers are each connected to
compute nodes via two redundant 40 GbE switches. Each storage
node has 256 GB memory, two 800 GB Intel NVMe P3700 accelera-
tor boards, and 198 TB raw capacity; yielding 1.5 PB raw capacity
for the entire cluster. Ten additional 8-core Advanced Clustering
control servers, each with 32 GB RAM, run the OpenStack APIs,
monitor storage operations and orchestrate VM lifecycles. Two of
the ten are network controllers for VM traffic and have dual 40
GbE network connections, while the remaining eight nodes have
dual Intel X520 10GbE network, and various purposes: two to run
the Ceph RADOS gateway, three Ceph storage monitors, one pri-
mary OpenStack API and identity controller, one OpenStack storage
controller, and one telemetry and admin node.
The Stratus platform is comprised of OpenStack services: Key-
stone, Cinder, Glance, Nova, Neutron, and Horizon. Keystone man-
ages projects, groups and user role assignments. Identity manage-
ment is outsourced by Keystone to the central UMN Shibboleth
server, also requiring Duo two-factor authentication [17]. The Cin-
der API provides the ability to create both storage and VM boot
volumes within Ceph block device storage. The Glance API pub-
lishes a repository of MSI-blessed machine images to all projects,
though denies permissions to create/modify images for regular
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Figure 1: Secure VMs start with “MSI-blessed” images con-
structed by DiskImage Builder. Cloud-Init and Puppet en-
sure that VMs are updated with the latest security patches
and configured for compliance at boot.
users. Since Glance images reside in block device storage, users can
create boot volumes as Copy-on-Write clones of these images, and
boot VMs in seconds. Cinder snapshots of boot volumes suffice as
machine images in the user-space and count toward project vol-
ume quotas. Nova manages virtual machines on compute nodes.
VMs are run with QEMU+KVM hardware accelerated virtualization
for minimal overhead. Although CPU pinning is a tuning option
to optimize compute-intensive workloads, it is incompatible with
live-migration, which is critical for Stratus to support long running
jobs. Nova is configured to oversubscribe hardware by a factor of
2x for vCPUs and 1x for memory. Neutron BGP dynamic routing
allows VMs to be assigned to campus routable RFC1918 IP subnets
and have their gateways automatically discovered by the network.
They can then communicate directly to other campus resources
without any Network Address Translation (NAT). Access to exter-
nal resources is provided by an upstream NAT device for outbound
routes, but no ingress connections are allowed. In a future version
of OpenStack, this configuration will allow floating IP addresses
to bypass the network nodes to send packets directly to the hyper-
visor host where the VM is currently located. The Horizon web
interface, which requires two-factor authentication to enter, binds
these separate web services into a single simple and intuitive portal
where users can perform self-service management of their infras-
tructure. For access to the OpenStack command line interface or to
connect to VMs, users must first SSH to the Stratus Bastion server
and authenticate with two factors.
3 SECURE VMSWITH MSI-BLESSED IMAGES
MSI provides a number of customized base images for users to
boot when creating a VM on Stratus. All images are Linux distribu-
tions such as Debian and CentOS. The primary benefit from users
leveraging MSI-provided customized images, versus the vanilla im-
ages direct from Linux distributions, is that MSI can enable basic
security controls for users and have peace of mind that a VM is
protected until users opt-out (at their own risk). Generating images
also presents an opportunity to properly configure remote desktop
(XRDP), and other heavy-weight research tools such as Galaxy [1],
which is a web-based workflow manager popular in the genomics
and proteomics communities.
There are three components that contribute to the images that
users interact with as illustrated by Figure 1. First the image is built
with DiskImage Builder [9], a tool created and supported by the
OpenStack community. DiskImage Builder composes images from a
prescribed set of features called Elements which each describe how
to provision individual softwares, configuration files, accounts, etc.
DiskImage Builder is extensible and MSI has generated a collection
of custom Elements to setup tools like the Minio Client and ensure
that Remote Desktop, and Docker run at boot.
When a VM boots, a service runs at startup called Cloud-Init
[5]. Cloud-Init pulls metadata from the OpenStack Nova metadata
server and configures settings at first boot like IP address, user
keys, etc. Cloud-init also has flexible mechanisms (e.g., vendor
data) for MSI to inject instructions and settings. In this case, Cloud-
Init forces VMs booted from MSI-blessed images to apply system
security updates. Security updates are the first field of defense in
ensuring the integrity of VMs and protecting all users from potential
compromise.
The final component contributing to secure a VM based on MSI-
blessed images is Puppet [16]. Puppet is provisioned in the image
by a DiskImage Builder element and runs as a daemon service
on the instance after boot. It periodically checks a master server
for reference configurations and will apply changes to the virtual
machine to match the reference. This ensures a base state on the
virtual machine such as user- and group-permissions, and ssh keys.
Although Puppet is traditionally used to fullymanage infrastructure,
this use-case is lightweight and intended for emergency patching
when necessary.
A strict naming convention is applied to images so users know
what Elements go into each image and the Linux distribution it is
based on. For instance, “Centos7_dbgap_blessed_desktop” describes
an image based on the CentOS 7 distribution, with dbGaP related
tools (e.g., gdc-client and aspera) for pulling dbGaP data from the
NIH, and Remote Desktop (“desktop”) running at boot.
MSI currently maintains 9 images. The available Linux distri-
butions are CentOS 7, Debian 9, and Ubuntu 16.04, and each dis-
tribution has Vanilla (i.e., the original image provided by the the
distribution) and dbGaP-blessed (MSI) variants. For the CentOS 7
distribution, MSI also offers variants to integrate Remote Desktop
and Galaxy services.
New images are periodically released as major security issues
are patched by distributions, or new features are requested by
users. The image build-process is automated, and as new images
are uploaded, old images are phased out.
4 STRATUS STORAGE
MSI selected the HPE Apollo 4200 server as the storage building
block for Stratus due to its high storage density, without being
too large to assemble a reasonable number of nodes for a viable
Ceph cluster. Each node supports 24 8 TB hard drives, six 960 GB
SSDs and two 800 GB NVMe flash cards in 2U of rack space. Each
individual hard drive or SSD is the basis of a single Ceph object
storage daemon (OSD). The NVMe flash provides high speed journal
space for the hard drive-based OSDs which provide the majority
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Figure 2: Stratus is sandboxed from other MSI services, but
VMs have access to three tiers of storage. Shields denote suit-
able for dbGaP data.
of the storage, reducing their write latency. Each NVMe flash card
supports journaling for 12 hard drive OSDs. The smaller set of SSD-
based OSDs contain indexes for the s3 object stores, as well as an
optional high performance block storage pool.
The drives are configured on the server as individual single-
drive RAID-0 units, rather than in “JBOD” pass-through mode, in
order to leverage the onboard cache of the RAID controllers. While
the servers RAID controller supports hardware encryption of the
connected storage, it was decided to avoid this in favor of Ceph’s
existing support for linux standard LUKS encryption. This was
motivated by several reasons: a) this kept the setup as hardware-
agnostic as possible; b) testing showed a negligible performance
impact (roughly 1%); and c) it was felt that Ceph’s encryption key
management was superior, storing the keys away from the storage
node in the Ceph monitor key-value store.
Within Ceph, Stratus storage is partitioned into three areas: a)
a 3x replicated block device storage for Cinder volumes with 200
TB usable capacity; b) an S3 object store for caching dbGaP data
with 500 TB capacity; and c) a persistent S3 object store for secure
archive. Both b) and c) are 4:2 erasure-coded. Each of these storage
classes uses its own set of underlying ceph storage pools, on which
quotas are enforced to maintain the desired partitioning.
S3 object lifecycle (expiration) was added as a feature in Ceph
Kraken, and is essential to the design of the dbGaP Cache. Lifecy-
cle policies are applied to buckets and impact all objects within.
Although this is still experimental, the plan is to enforce a default
expiration of 60-days, such that objects are deleted following a
First-In-First-Out policy. If greater than 80% of the dbGaP Cache
is filled, we gradually reduce this threshold until utilization falls
below the 80% mark. While a Least Recently Used lifecycle policy
might be seen as preferable, s3 storage semantics make this unlikely
to be possible; object creation being the only stored timestamp.
From the user perspective Stratus has three storage tiers, which
are illustrated in Figure 2. Volumes are the first tier, and the layer
where active data processing occurs. The second tier, secure archive,
is the combination of Stratus’ two secure object stores where users
can target either dbGaP Cache (“s3cache”) or persistent secure stor-
age (“s3secure”). Users interact with this tier using an s3 client; our
recommendation being Minio Client (“mc”), both for ease of use,
and because recent versions support server-side data encryption
using customer-provided keys (SSE-C). A third “general archive”
tier, is MSI’s general-purpose S3 object store on a separate dedi-
cated Ceph cluster . It is through this general archive that data can
be brought in from other MSI resources. Stratus users can move
data here when it is sanitized and would not violate the data-use
agreement to be stored in an unprotected environment.
A typical workflow begins with using the Horizon web interface
to boot a VM with a small boot volume plus a large (e.g. 1 TB)
workspace volume. Next, the user connects to the VMvia the Stratus
Bastion server and transfers the desired dbGaP data set from the
NIH endpoints to the workspace volume for analysis. The dbGaP
data can optionally be copied into the s3 dbGaP cache for later reuse
without retransfer from NIH. Intermediate data produced during
analysis can also be stashed in the dbGaP Cache, while final results
can be stored in persistent secure storage. At any point during
analysis, the user can grow the size of the workspace, snapshot it,
or detach it from one VM and attach it elsewhere (e.g., if workflow
stages are setup as separate VMs). When analysis is complete, the
user can post sanitized data to MSI’s general-purpose S3 storage
where they can access it from other MSI resources or share with
colleagues.
A similar workflow is adopted by users of the Galaxy machine
image on Stratus. In those cases, the Galaxy software stores data
in the dbGaP Cache, and performs read and write operations on a
local volume with small quota ( 200 GB up to 2 TB). As the quota
is reached, data on the local volume is purged automatically by
Galaxy. The benefit of dbGaP Cache in this case is that users can
process significantly more data with a small VM footprint.
In future, several improvements to the storage subsystem may
be investigated. For example, Ceph’s new “bluestore” storage back-
end is now considered stable, and offers potential performance im-
provements. The “Queens” release of OpenStack adds native LUKS
encryption of volumes, which would permit compliance with more
stringent data-use agreements by supporting customer-specific
encryption keys on active volumes. Another feature anticipated
in Queens is multi-attach volumes, which would enable users to
attach their large workspace volume to more than one VM simulta-
neously, and vastly simplify multi-VM workflows. The presence of
multi-attach could dramatically impact the level of block storage
utilization.
5 HPC-LIKE PERFORMANCE
Once the Stratus production system was deployed, MSI invested
a significant amount of time to benchmark the system and assess
the prospect of achieving HPC-like performance on the cloud. As a
baseline for HPC performance expectations, the performance on
Stratus matched against the performance on Mesabi, MSI’s flagship
HPC.
Figure 3 compares the HPL [15] peak performance on a bare
metal node (Mesabi) and a 16 vCPU VM (Stratus) running on a
28 core Broadwell node). Weak scaling makes the problem size
per thread constant, so that the amount of work per thread stays
constant as the number of threads is increased. Whereas strong
scaling fixes the problem size, and that work is spread over in-
creasing numbers of threads, so the amount of work per thread
decreases as the number of threads is increased. Weak scaling used
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Figure 3: HPL peak performance on a bare metal HPC-node
of Mesabi versus a cloud-based VM running on Stratus.
a matrix size that used 80% of 2 GB/thread, which is calculated
as N =
√
(t ∗ 0.8 ∗ 2 ∗ 10243)/8 where t is the number of threads
specified for the benchmark. Note that the root is required because
N represents one side of a square matrix. The strong scaling runs
used an N based on 80% of 2 GB. The choice of 2 GB/thread was
arbitrary, but was chosen to fill most of the available memory on
Mesabi’s 64 GB nodes when the number of threads is scaled up to
24, and also ensures the HPL calculation is not entirely resident in
cache.
The yellow and red curves show the strong and weak scaling
peak performance attained using HPL on a bare metal Haswell (dual
12 core 2.5 GHz Xeon E5-2680 v3) node (Mesabi), which has a peak
performance of 40.0 GFLOPS/core. At 1 thread, peak performance
of 91% shows very reasonable peak performance. Within the HPC
community, getting over 90% of peak for HPL performance is gener-
ally considered excellent performance. The purple and blue curves
show the strong and weak scaling peak performance attained using
HPL on a cloud based Broadwell (dual 14 core 2.4 GHz Xeon E5-2680
v4) 16 vCPU VM (Stratus), which has a peak performance of 46.4
GFLOPS/core. At 1 thread, peak performance of 87% shows an ap-
proximate 5% loss due to virtualization overhead relative to the bare
metal Haswell node. It is worth noting that for the Mesabi system,
lscpu reports an L3 cache of 30 MB for the system, but within the
virtualized system no L3 cache was reported. This missing tier of
cache could certainly degrade the performance by affecting the VM
kernel scheduler, resulting in the scheduler generating unnecessary
inter-processor interrupts.
For the red weak scaling curve, the peak performance is main-
tained at about 91% as we increase the number of threads, indicating
good scaling behaviour, until 16 threads is reached, when perfor-
mance reaches 86%. This reduction to 86% indicates that even the
weak scaling case does not scale all the way up to 16 threads, likely
due to memory/cache contention on the node. Likewise, the blue
weak scaling Stratus curve maintains good scaling behaviour at
about 87% peak performance out to 8 threads, then dips to 83%
at 16 threads. The performance loss for the weak scaling runs is
shown by the black curve, i.e. the Mesabi bare metal weak scaling
Figure 4: Stratus storage write bandwidth for both 3x repli-
cated block device storage and erasure coded object storage.
peak performance minus the Stratus VM weak scaling peak per-
formance. It shows that weak scaling peak performance is fairly
consistent across the number of threads, at around 5% loss due to
virtualization.
For the yellow strong scaling curve, performance decreases as
the number of threads is increased, which is normal strong scaling
behaviour. The strong scaling behaviour for the Stratus VM shown
by the purple curve is similar to the bare metal Haswell node,
except when the number of threads is 16, the strong scaling peak
performance reaches 59.4%, mentioned below. The performance
loss for the strong scaling runs is shown by the green curve, the
strong scaling analogue to the black curve. The performance loss
for the strong and weak scaling are consistent at about 5%, until
16 threads are reached, when the strong scaling performance loss
increases to 12%, while the weak scaling performance loss decreases
to 3%. At 16 threads, the strong scaling on the virtualized resource
is performing worse. However, this is not of much concern since
the shrinking problem size is already unable to saturate the core, so
any amount of noise in the solution is going to heavily impact the
performance. In fact, we see a significant increase in the standard
deviation as we increase the number of threads from 8 to 16.
Figure 4 compares the performance achieved by the 3x replicated
pool to the erasure-coded pools on the cluster. For this test, ten
compute nodes were each running the RADOS benchmark tool
with eight concurrent operations. The 4:2 (k :m) configuration of
the erasure-coded pool uses 1.5 MB of space in backend storage for
every MB of data written to the pool. The 3x replicated pool writes
3 MB of data to the HDD for every MB written. The replicated pool
outperforms the erasure-coded pool for small writes. In addition
to the added CPU load from object storage, every object stored on
the erasure-coded pool writes a total of 6 objects (k +m) to the
HDD-backed OSDs. This leads to the observed performance in the
IOPs-limited regime. For large objects (> 1 MB), the erasure-coded
pool finally outperforms the replicated pool. At the 4 MB object
size, the 3x replicated pool is writing 12,234 MB/s to the backend
storage (4078 ∗ 3), and the erasure-coded pool is only writing at
9,465 MB/s (6310 ∗ 1.5).
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In terms of observed performance within VMs, a number of FIO
[6] storage benchmarks on Stratus showed the Volume storage ca-
pable of achieving 270 MB/s in write bandwidth. This performance
is impressively 12.5% higher than the 240 MB/s write bandwidth
achieved by FIO on Mesabi’s high performance filesystem. Obvi-
ously, there are major scaling differences between the two systems,
and they have been architected for different purposes. However,
Stratus certainly demonstrates HPC-like performance in storage as
well as compute.
6 STRATUS SUBSCRIPTION
Due to the specialized nature of Stratus, the small size, and the
potential need for growth, it was decided that it should be offered
as a paid service. An annual subscription fee was developed using
Cornell’s Red Cloud [4] as a model. The base subscription costs
less than a thousand dollars per year, but allots users 16 vCPUs, 32
GB RAM, 2 TB of Volume storage, and access to the shared dbGaP
Cache for short-term data storage. Users are also granted access
to a number of MSI-blessed CentOS and Ubuntu base images, and
sudo permissions to install software on personal virtual machines.
Additional vCPUs, Volume storage, and persistent object storage
can be added à la carte in 1 vCPU or 1 TB/year increments over the
base subscription. Subscription pricing is calculated based on zero-
profit cost recovery of the hardware, including all network switches,
and all control-, storage-, and compute-nodes. Staff time for opera-
tional/administrative tasks and user support are also factored into
the price. Network traffic is excluded. Note that the subscription
ensures cost-recovery of the system at 85% utilization and allows
for continuous expansion as popularity grows. The presence of a
fee also ensures that most (not all) users will exercise good cloud
hygiene and actively clean-up/scale-in their resources when not
needed.
This new model has three benefits: a) as the popularity of Stratus
grows, cost recovery ensures funds will be available to scale the
cluster; b) it encourages casual users to continue working on tradi-
tional HPC systems where MSI provides cycles and limited storage
for free; and c) it encourages serious users to practice good cloud
hygiene by securing the space they are paying for, and to clean up
after themselves. Although the base subscription is generous, all
VM boot volumes, data volumes and snapshots count against the 2
TB Volume allocation, and that space can fill quickly.
Subscriptions are mapped into OpenStack using built-in service
quotas. OpenStack attaches quotas to individual projects, with tog-
gles for vCPU count, size of volumes and snapshots, RAM, etc.
Object storage quotas are applied at the bucket-level on Ceph.
7 GDS COMPLIANCE
Most cloud providers absolve themselves from responsibility of
protecting users, focusing instead on the minimum effort necessary
for regulatory compliance within the underlying hardware, and
leaving users to individually manage and vet whatever is run on top
of the cloud. This makes sense in a self-service Infrastructure-as-
a-Service model, but creates a potentially dangerous situation for
novice users with protected data. Stratus was built with an MSI-first
mentality, prioritizing security of the hardware, OpenStack, and
Ceph. However, as an academic unit supporting computationally
Figure 5: Compliance is met with an MSI-first policy that fo-
cuses on securing MSI, OpenStack, and Ceph. Users are pro-
tected with sane defaults and network security.
Table 1: Firewall restrictions for Stratus
Scope Ingress Egress
World None ALL
UMN 443, 8443 with SSL1 ALL
Stratus ALL via Stratus Bastion1 ALL
Project ALL ALL
1 requires Security Group exceptions
intensive research at the University of Minnesota since 1984, MSI
has a culture of going the extra mile to train, protect, and assist. In
this case, a fair amount of effort also went into sandboxing user
VMs and providing sane defaults for security that users can opt-out
of at their own risk. This included following the best practices guide
for GDS data [13] as a checklist. All bullets therein were treated as
required controls. Note that the NIH best practices go beyond what
most large research computing facilities can or need to do.
Figure 5 illustrates a sampling of protections for MSI and users
as two trees. While outside the scope of this document to exhaus-
tively detail each measure, there is clearly a bias toward protecting
MSI. The MSI tree on the left has two levels of nodes. The first
level are five significant controls mentioned by the best practices
guide (i.e., Encryption, Logging, Principle of Least Privilege, Access
Control, and Change Management), and the second level summa-
rizes some of the ways we have addressed them. The majority of
the GDS controls are intangible to users, but represent substantial
administrative and operational staff effort.
The USER tree offers measures that users are aware of. A few
relate to GDS controls (e.g., two-factor authentication), but others
go above and beyond. The most impactful measures deal with net-
work traffic. In most clouds, users get unrestricted traffic in and out
of VMs. Table 1 presents firewall rules—both ingress and egress—
for VMs on Stratus. In all cases, egress traffic is unrestricted, but
ingress is only open between VMs within the same project, or from
the Stratus Bastion (so long as Security Group exceptions exist).
Traffic is blocked on all ports from the world, but when it originates
from the campus network, ports 443 and 8443 are accessible with
caveats: a) SSL is required on both, and b) users must create a Secu-
rity Group exception to opt-out of the default network protection.
These rules sandbox Stratus VMs away from other MSI services, the
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University, and the world. For VMs requiring world-wide access,
MSI recommends the NIH cloud pilots [3, 7, 8].
Encryption is essential for data obfuscation and protection, and
it is leveraged on many levels including full-disk encryption of
storage disks, encrypted network traffic, and user-encrypted data
at rest. Access controls limit who can interact with systems, soft-
ware, and data, and also establish how users are properly identified
(e.g., with two-factors). Principle of Least Privilege prevents ad-
ministrators and users from running software, accessing data, or
completing any other tasks for which they are not approved. Log-
ging is mandatory and encompasses tracking account access, data
access, software installations, account escalations, violations, etc.
Logging also extends to parsing, management, and protection of
log integrity. Lastly, Change Management tracks modifications to
Stratus including web service configurations, software updates, as
well as physical hardware changes.
8 CONCLUSION
Technical details of Stratus, a subscription-based Infrastructure as
a Service for research computing, were presented herein. Stratus
satisfies the immediate need for an environment to securely process
dbGaP data at the University of Minnesota, and meets or exceeds
the requirements laid out by the NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy.
Future work will consider compliance with other regulations, as
well as supporting use cases with unrestricted data types. This may
include cluster solutions for processing dbGaP data (e.g., projects
like Kubernetes). Also, MSI is currently piloting a general-use par-
tition within Stratus for non-dbGaP projects and open-access data
types. Projects under the general space are separated from dbGaP
users by a second neutron provider, and subject to less stringent
access controls and firewall rules.
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